We evaluate the short horizon predictive ability of financial conditions indexes for stock returns and macroeconomic variables. We find reliable predictability only when the sample includes the 2008 financial crisis, and we argue that this result is driven by tailoring the indexes to the crisis and by non-synchronous trading. Financial conditions indexes are based on a variety of constituent variables and aggregation methods, and we discuss a simple procedure for consolidating the growing number of different indexes into a single proxy for financial conditions.
Introduction
The severity and the economic impact of the 2008 financial crisis have led to a proliferation of indexes that proxy for financial conditions or financial stress, which we collectively refer to as financial conditions indexes (FCIs) . In this paper we evaluate whether FCIs can predict stock returns or innovations to macroeconomic variables over a one-month or a one-quarter horizon. We focus on predictability over relatively short horizons in order to capture the effect that the health of the financial system has on the broader economy, rather than longer run predictability arising from business cycle fluctuations. In addition, we suggest a simple procedure for aggregating the various FCIs into a single proxy for financial conditions. We find that most FCIs can predict monthly and quarterly returns on the S&P 500 and on a portfolio of financial companies, and also innovations to a number of macroeconomic variables -but only if the period around the 2008 financial crisis is included (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) .
Such narrow predictability could be the result of threshold effects, in that financial conditions matter only after they deteriorate sufficiently.
1 A second possibility is that the FCIs we consider have predictive power because they typically include variables that, like the is that some of the predictive power is the result of non-synchronous data: most FCIs, for instance, include VIX, an implied volatility index derived from options on the S&P 500.
These options trade for 15 minutes after trading on the underlying index ends (4:15pm versus 4:00pm Eastern Time), with the consequence that VIX on day t contains information that will be reflected in stock prices only on day t+1 -a fact that can generate spurious
1
In Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) , for instance, financing constraints at the firm level only become binding in tight-money environments. Hubrich and Tetlow (2012) find that macroeconomic dynamics crucially depend on financial stress, with stress being "of negligible importance in 'normal' times, but of critical importance when the economy is in a high-stress [...] state." (page 30).
predictability.
FCIs are typically designed to measure whether broad financial conditions are loose or tight by historical standards (for instance, the Bloomberg and Chicago Fed indexes), or whether the financial system is experiencing historically unusual stress (e.g., the Carlson, Lewis, and Nelson (2012) index). The importance of a well-functioning financial system to the broad economy is highlighted by the results in Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) , Peek and Rosengren (1997) , Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), and Paravisini (2008) , who show that tight monetary policy, binding capital ratios, and bank financing constraints can reduce the supply of credit. The effect is stronger in the case of small banks with less liquid assets (Kashyap and Stein (2000)), and the impact is felt more directly by small firms (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) , Khwaja and Mian (2008) ) and bankdependent borrowers (Chava and Purnanandam (2011) ). A tight credit supply ultimately affects investment (Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) ), inventories (Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) ), and the broader economy (Bernanke (1983) , Peek and Rosengren (1997) , Peek and Rosengren (2000) , Calomiris and Mason (2003) ).
The existing evidence is mixed on whether FCIs should be thought of as coincident indicators, or early warning indicators. While some studies suggest that FCIs can predict selected economic variables, the results are often unstable across sub-periods, which could be due to the FCIs including variables that have prominently characterized recent crises. In addition, the results may point to predictive power only at business-cycle frequency, which means that FCIs could be proxying for periodic changes in economic activity, rather than for the state of the financial system. As an example, Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010) focus on predicting macroeconomic variables over one and two quarters, and they find that the FCIs they study seldom have better predictive power than stock market returns. The authors note on page 21 that:
"the better performance during the most recent five years (relative to both the average of the alternative FCIs and KC Fed's index as representative of one of the better performing FCIs) may reflect selection bias in our choice of variables to include in the index: naturally, our selection was governed in part by an understanding of the types of financial variables that were used for monitoring and measuring the recent financial crisis. In this sense, we did not seek to mitigate observer bias."
Our predictability analysis relies on simple predictive regressions of a set of stock returns or innovations to macroeconomic variables on lagged FCI values. We keep the indexes in levels, instead of using changes, because the authors uniformly emphasize that their FCIs are ordinal measures of financial conditions/stress. Relative to Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010) , who also evaluate the predictive power of several FCIs,
we study predictability at a monthly as well as quarterly horizon, in order to minimize the risk that we find predictability arising from business cycle effects. Second, we study a larger number of FCIs and a larger number of financial and macroeconomic variables. Third, we explicitly discuss whether the predictability that arises in coincidence with the 2008 financial crisis is hard-wired in the FCIs, in the sense that the variables included in the FCIs may have been chosen on the basis of whether they experienced large fluctuations in 2007 and
2008. Finally, as described in the next paragraph, we assess the statistical significance of predicability with a methodology that is robust to biases generated by the high persistence that typically characterizes FCIs.
As is clear from the time series plots in Figure 2 , FCIs tend to be quite persistent. The high autocorrelation that characterizes the FCIs is also evident in the confidence intervals for the autoregressive roots shown in Table 2 . 2 We report confidence intervals, rather than point estimates, to highlight that, after accounting for statistical uncertainty, the FCIs plausibly have autoregressive roots very close to one. In 5 cases, we are actually unable to reject the
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The procedure for calculating the confidence intervals in Table 2 is described in the online appendix to Campbell and Yogo (2006) .
hypothesis that the FCIs have a unit root. The high persistence of the indexes is important to us because we use them as predictors, and relying on standard asymptotics when testing the null of no predictability in the presence of a highly persistent predictor can be inappropriate, if other conditions detailed in Section 2 are met. Specifically, it can lead to a rejection rate that is inconsistent with the nominal size of the test. We therefore use, where applicable, the local-to-unit asymptotics procedure of Campbell and Yogo (2006) , which corrects for this rejection bias.
In the second part of our analysis we discuss a simple two-step methodology for combining the different FCIs into a single proxy for financial conditions. The large number of
FCIs is itself indicative of the uncertainty that surrounds the measurement of financial conditions, and aggregating the individual indexes can help average out model uncertainty and identify a cleaner proxy.
We first identify the five indexes that best summarize the information provided by the remaining FCIs. As detailed in Section 3, we do so on the basis of the adjusted R 2 from regressions of changes in the principal component of all indexes -except for index i -on changes in index i. While it is possible that a low R 2 is the result of an index being a unique and more accurate measure of financial conditions, the broad nature and the overlap of the variables included in the FCIs (like Treasury yields, or the implied volatility index VIX) renders such a possibility unlikely. In the second step we form all combinations of the five indexes, and select the "best" combination on the basis of how well it summarizes the information in the remaining FCIs, again on the basis of the adjusted R 2 from regressions that, in order to minimize overfitting concerns, we run on several subsamples.
In Section 2 we evaluate the predictive power of a comprehensive selection of FCIs, using stock returns and macroeconomic quantities as dependent variables. In Section 3 we discuss the merits of combining a subset of FCIs into a composite FCI. Section 4 concludes.
Assessing the Predictive Ability of FCIs
The set of 12 FCIs that we consider includes indexes that (1) focus on the United States, (2) are available at a monthly or higher frequency, and (3) have a sufficiently long history (see Table 1 , which also reports data sources and lists the abbreviated names we use in the paper). Carlson, Lewis, and Nelson (2012) , which is expressed in terms of probabilities. Table 3 ) range between 22%
and 96%, with the majority being above 70%.
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In order to increase the power of our test, we require that the FCIs cover the stressful episodes that characterized the late 1990s (the Asian and Russian financial crises, LTCM collapse We evaluate the predictive power of the 12 FCIs we study with a series of monthly and quarterly predictive regressions of the form:
The FCIs enter the predictive regressions in levels, instead of changes, because financial conditions are likely to have real effects when they are unusually tight or unusually loose, rather than when they move within their normal range. We do not control for the predictive power of other variables, like the variance risk premium (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) ), because the results from regressions in which FCIs are the only predictor already suggest that they lack reliable predictive power at the horizons we focus on.
The FCI coefficient is estimated with OLS, and we assess its statistical significance with either heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, or with the local-to-unity asymptotics procedure of Campbell and Yogo (2006) . Local-to-unity asymptotics is useful in evaluating the statistical significance of persistent predictors, because, in such cases, the standard t-test can give a rejection rate that is inconsistent with its nominal size.
In practice, we assume that each of the FCIs follows an AR(1) process, and use localto-unity asymptotics unless the autoregressive root of the FCI is sufficiently distant from one, in a sense defined below, or unless there is no correlation between the innovations to the FCI's autoregressive process and the innovations in a regression of the predicted variable on the FCI. Note that both a persistent predictor and a non-zero correlation are necessary for the standard OLS asymptotics to be inappropriate. Using the notation in Campbell and Yogo (2006) , we rely on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors if the DF-GLS statistic is less than -5 (a more negative DF-GLS statistic shifts the confidence interval for the autoregressive root of the predictor away from one), or if the parameterδ (which measures the correlation between the innovations) is equal to 0.
5
The dependent variables in our predictive regressions are (a) returns on a broad market index and on various industry portfolios, and (b) autoregressive residuals of several economic variables. We consider monthly and quarterly returns on the S&P 500 and on seven equally weighted industry portfolios: finance, construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, and services. The macroeconomic variables we consider measure the availability of credit (total consumer credit, and commercial and industrial loans), the state of the housing market (housing starts), and manufacturing activity (durable goods orders, industrial production, and total manufacturing inventory).
6
We first present the results that focus on whether FCIs can predict stock returns in One potential source of predictability is non-synchroneity across markets: many FCIs,
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When needed, we linearly interpolate the values obtained from the lookup tables in the online appendix to Campbell and Yogo (2006) , which only provide a discrete set of values forδ and of the DF-GLS statistic. Table 4 for summary statistics and additional details on the construction of the industry portfolios.
for instance, include the S&P 500 option implied volatility index VIX, which is based on options whose trading ends 15 minutes after the trading for stocks does -a fact that could cause spurious predictability (see Atchison, Butler, and Simonds (1987) for a discussion of the effects of non-synchronous trading on the autocorrelation of equity index returns).
We explore this possibility by running predictive regressions on monthly industry returns that skip the first day of each month. Table 6 shows that now only 5 of the 12 FCIs have statistically significant predictive power for the "Finance" portfolio, down from 11 in Table 5, suggesting that non-synchroneity does play a role, but is not the sole driver of predictability.
The severity of the 2008 financial crisis naturally raises the question of whether the predictive power of the FCIs mainly arises from the events that started in early 2007, or whether it is also present in the broader sample. In Table 7 we report the coefficients and
RMSEs estimated over the 1995-2006 sample, and the results highlight that, essentially, there is no predictability left. Later in this section we discuss whether the lack of predictive power outside of the 2008 crisis is due to predictability only being there during periods of financial stress, or whether it is the result of the FCIs being tailored to the recent financial crisis.
The conclusions that we can draw from monthly returns also carry over to quarterly returns, for which results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 . The number of FCIs with predictive power for returns on the S&P 500 or on the financial industry portfolio in the 1995-2012 sample is 5. Similar to the monthly analysis, returns on the remaining industry portfolios are not predictable. Excluding the first day of each quarter when computing the returns (untabulated results) does not change the statistical significance of the coefficients, although restricting the sample to the pre-crisis period (1995-2006, Table 9 ) all but eliminates the predictability, with the exception of the Morgan Stanley index, which can now predict returns on 5 portfolios. Note that the coefficients for the Morgan Stanley index are positive, while they were negative at the monthly horizon in the full sample (Table 5 ). The positive sign is consistent with the possibility that, already at the quarterly horizon, the predictive power of the Morgan Stanley index may be due to business cycle predictability -poor current financial conditions imply that, over a medium/long horizon, economic and financial conditions are more likely to improve than to further deteriorate, and stock returns will likely be positive.
We now discuss whether the FCIs are informative about future innovations to the macroeconomic variables we mentioned earlier in this section. In order to implement the Campbell and Yogo (2006) procedure, the only covariate we include in the predictive regressions is one of the FCIs, and we account for autocorrelation in macroeconomic variable changes by using the residuals from log-change autoregressions as the dependent variable, where the number of lags is chosen on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion.
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The first set of results, reported in Table 10 , focuses on one-month ahead predictability, with the sample running from 1995 to 2012. When the sample excludes the 2008 financial crisis (Table 11) , however, the evidence in favor of predictability is weak, with most indexes being able to predict only one macroeconomic variable -typically industrial production. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on quarterly horizons, as shown in Tables 12 and 13 (only the Morgan Stanley index can predict more variables in the short sample than in the full sample).
One possible reason why the predictability we find in the 1995-2012 sample is not robust to the exclusion of 2007-2012 is that it is subject to threshold effects, in that only 7
At the monthly frequency, we use two lags for total consumer credit, commercial and industrial loans, industrial production, and total manufacturing inventory, and one lag for durable goods orders and housing starts. At the quarterly frequency, we use two lags for total consumer credit and total manufacturing inventory, one lag for commercial and industrial loans and industrial production, and zero lags for durable goods orders and housing starts.
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While we expect a negative relation between a worsening of current financial conditions and future economic activity, some coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 are positive. The reason is that the Campbell and Yogo (2006) procedure requires a negative correlation between current innovations to the dependent variable and the predictor, hence we sometimes need to multiply the FCI by -1. We systematically check that the sign of the estimated coefficient is as expected: positive if the FCI (multiplied by -1 as applicable) signals stress when low, negative otherwise.
poor financial conditions can predict future returns or macroeconomic conditions. In Figure   3 we show a scatter plot of innovations to log-changes of total inventory against the St. Louis The evidence in Figure 3 is not supportive of a threshold effect, in that the negative relationship between FCI and log-changes in inventories is only evident in the observations from the recent crisis. We argue that the "recent financial crisis effect" arises either (1) because predictability is only present when investors expect that large dislocations are approaching (for instance, correlations can change, and FCIs ultimately measure correlations);
or (2) because the variables underlying the many FCIs constructed after the 2008 crisis were chosen based on their movements during the crisis. 9 It is difficult to empirically assess the merit of (1) and (2) above, not least because only one major financial crisis is included in the sample.
Our opinion is that the empirical evidence in favor of the FCIs having reliable predictive power is weak, especially in light of the fact that the FCIs are built by combining public data for typically highly liquid financial instruments -hence they can hardly be characterized as containing privileged information.
Efficiently Combining FCIs
In the previous section we established that the FCIs we study have weak predictive power for broad economic developments. We now turn to the question of how to consolidate the increasingly large number of indexes into a single proxy for financial conditions. The implicit assumption in searching for the "best" combination is that the FCIs we focus on provide broadly similar information, and that no FCI stands out by virtue of measuring financial conditions with greatly superior accuracy. We believe such assumption is validated by the largely comparable performance of the different indexes in the predictability analysis discussed above, and by the fact that the FCIs mostly include variables that capture broad macroeconomic trends (for example, Treasury yields, or S&P 500 option implied volatility).
We propose a simple methodology to combine the various FCIs into a single proxy for financial conditions, which entails calculating the first principal component of a subset of appropriately chosen indexes. The FCIs themselves are already an aggregation of underlying variables, often based on a principal component analysis. The procedure we describe below can be seen as a higher level consolidation that aggregates across different variable sets and methodologies, with the objective of smoothing out transitory fluctuations and extracting a more informative proxy for financial conditions.
First, we sort the individual indexes on the basis of how well they capture the information contained in the remaining FCIs. We measure this ability to capture information using the adjusted R 2 from regressions 10 of changes in the first principal component of all indexes except for index i on changes in index i. Letting i denote the FCI of interest, with i = 1, ..., 12, and "fpc" the calculation of the first principal component:
In the interest of robustness, we also run a second set of regressions where the dependent and independent variables are one-lag autoregressive residuals of, respectively, ∆P C −i and
It is, of course, possible for these regressions to yield a low R 2 if index i does not span the remaining FCIs because it is a radically better proxy for financial conditions. As noted
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We use robust regressions (Hamilton (1991) ), which reduce the influence of outliers.
above, the overlap and the encompassing nature of the variables that underlie the different indexes makes such a possibility unlikely. given that the two indexes are built in a similar way, and that BFCI+ ranks noticeably worse than BFCI in the shorter sample, we exclude BFCI+ from the set of best-performing indexes. We replace BFCI+ with the Kansas City index, which ranks sixth in the 1995-2012 sample, and fifth when excluding the years around the 2008 financial crisis.
In the second step we form all combinations of the five indexes selected above, 11 calculate each combination's first principal component, and regress 12 changes in the first principal component of the FCIs (out of the 12 we study) that are not in the combination under consideration on changes in the first principal component of the combination. Letting C denote the combination of interest:
In order to minimize the risk of overfitting, the regressions are run on several subsamples, and we use the resulting set of adjusted R 2 to select the "best" combination of FCIs. Specifically, we calculate, for each combination and in each subsample, the squared deviation of the combination's adjusted R 2 relative to the highest adjusted R 2 in each sub-
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We form 31 different combinations: five individual indexes, ten sets of two indexes, ten sets of three indexes, five sets of four indexes, and one set of five indexes.
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We again use robust regressions (see Hamilton (1991) sample. We then average, for each combination, the squared deviations across time periods, and use the averages to identify the "best" composite FCI. Table 15 reports five averages: the first (column A) shows arithmetic averages; in the second (B) the average is weighted by the ratio of daily S&P 500 return volatility in each subsample over the volatility in the full sample; in the third (C) it is weighted by the ratio of the average VIX level in each subsample over the average VIX level in the full sample; in the fourth (D) weights are based on the volatility of daily VIX changes; in the fifth (E) the arithmetic average is calculated on the four non-overlapping samples (7/95-12/98 through 1/06-6/12).
The criterion we use to rank the FCIs is, of course, one of potentially many. For example, we could have selected the FCIs with the lowest volatility. Such choice would have implied an assumption on the way financial conditions change over time, namely that they evolve smoothly. Choosing the FCIs with the highest volatility would have implied that we assume financial conditions can change rapidly, and that we are looking for a more reactive proxy. Precisely to avoid imposing strong assumptions on the nature of the process for financial conditions, we have adopted a criterion that focuses on making efficient use of the available data, and that only assumes that (1) all the indexes we study provide some information about financial conditions, and that (2) none of the indexes is likely to contain uniquely accurate information about financial conditions.
The results in Table 15 and the CFCI shows a largely steady deterioration in financial conditions. In addition, the CFCI points to loose financial conditions in the second half of the 1990s until late 1998, while, over the same period, VIX points to slowly deteriorating conditions starting in 1995.
In Figure 6 we plot the 24-month exponentially-weighted rolling correlation between VIX changes and changes in the CFCI, where observations are weighted so that the weight decays by 50% every 12 months (see Figure 6 for details). The correlation is initially low, but it 
Conclusion
We provide an assessment of the one-month and one-quarter ahead predictive power that a selection of indexes of financial conditions and financial stress (to which we collectively refer as FCIs) have for returns on a broad equity index and a set of equity industry portfolios, and for innovations to log-changes in macroeconomic variables that proxy for the state of consumer and business credit, manufacturing, and housing. The evidence for predictive power at the horizons we consider is weak -unless the financial crisis is included -and it highlights the role of non-synchronous trading and, potentially, data mining. The graph shows the exponentially-weighted correlation (black dotted line) between monthly changes in the volatility index VIX and monthly changes in the Composite FCI, together with the VIX index, which is standardized for scale reasons (red dashed line), and the Composite FCI (CFCI, blue solid line). The correlation is calculated on the basis of a 24-month rolling window, where the weights decay by 50% every 12 months. Specifically, the weights assigned to observations {t − i} (2012) is based on an index developed in 2003. All indexes are expressed as z-scores, with the exception of the CLN FSI, which is a probability. In the empirical analysis we replace the CLN FSI with its natural logarithm (the index never is exactly zero in our sample). The table reports the coefficients and root mean squared errors (both in %) of predictive regressions of one-quarter ahead innovations to log-changes in macroeconomic variables on FCI levels. See Tables 1 and 4 for more details on the FCIs and on the macroeconomic variables. Asterisks indicate significance at the 90% level. Statistical significance is evaluated on the basis of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, or, where appropriate, with the local-to-unity asymptotics procedure of Campbell and Yogo (2006) (Hamilton (1991) ) of changes in the first principal component of all the FCIs (aside from the one indicated in each row) on changes in the indicated FCI (columns "∆PC"), and of one-lag autoregressive residuals of changes in the first principal component of all the FCIs (aside from the one indicated in each row) on one-lag autoregressive residuals of the changes in the indicated FCI (columns "Res.∆"). The first six columns report the adjusted R 58.68
